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On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law
Gillian Hadfield*
University of Southern California Law School
Eric Talley**
University of Southern California Law School
Law inmodernmarket societies servesbothdemocratic andeconomic functions.
In its economic function, law is a service, ameansof enhancing the valueof trans-
actions and organizations. Yet modernmarket economies continue to rely on the
state, rather than the market, to provide this service. This article investigates
whether private provision of law may be superior to public provision. We look
in particular at corporate law, where there is a substantial literature exploring
the efficiency implications of ‘‘regulatory competition’’ and compare this compe-
tition with market competition between private providers. Drawing from the well-
known framework of spatial models of imperfect competition, we argue that while
neither public nor private competition may lead to the optimal corporate law
regimes, there are at least some reasons to believe that private provision may
be preferable. Specifically, we present a model that demonstrates when regula-
tory competition is likely to produce widespread emulation and little innovation.
Private competition, in contrast, is more likely to lead to greater ‘‘product’’ differ-
entiation, which benefits heterogeneous consumers of corporate law services in
the short term.Moreover, such differentiation also has long-termbenefits, as pro-
viders are able to ‘‘learn’’ more about business organizations’ demand-side char-
acteristics and can thus tailor their services to business needs more effectively.
1. Introduction
In modern market democracies, law serves a multitude of functions. It regu-
lates the relationship between state and citizen, providing the framework for
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democratic governance. It protects individual rights, accomplishes the transfers
inherent in the welfare state, and maintains social order. And it provides
the structure for economic activity: establishing property rights and providing
a means of commitment and dispute resolution to support transactions and
organizations.
The democratic functions of law—those that involve the fundamental social
contract between the governed and the government—are provided almost ex-
clusively by state actors: public courts and legislatures established and regu-
lated in turn by constitutional documents or principles. Most notions of
democratic legitimacy virtually require that the state play this role. Indeed,
a basic principle of democracy is that the state may exercise power and
may only exercise power vis-a`-vis the governed through institutions that
are accountable, ultimately, to the polity.
What is less clear, however, is why the economic functions of law—the
market structuring functions—are produced by the state. Why does the state
assume responsibility for designing the structure of the relationships within
and between economic entities when the instrumental objective is not demo-
cratic legitimacy, but rather market efficiency? Law in its economic function is
largely a service. It enhances the value of transactions; it coordinates activities,
provides a means of commitment, and resolves disputes in the cooperative
endeavors that characterize economic activity. The optimal provision of law
in these functions means the efficient design and implementation of the rules
that structure and regulate the market economy.
Hadfield (2000, 2001) has explored these issues in general terms, raising the
question of whether the economic functions of law might be better provided
by private, competitive entities rather than the state. In this article, we explore
a specific instance of this question—namely, the efficiency implications of pub-
lic versus private provision of the law of corporations. Corporate law allows the
creation of a distinct legal entity, capable of engaging in transactions (owning
property, lending and borrowing capital, entering into and enforcing contracts)
as an actor separate from its shareholders. When corporate law is functioning
well, it offers an efficient means of accomplishing these functions. Our ques-
tion, then, is whether we should expect public entities to provide efficient
corporate law or whether competitive private entities would do a better job.
Efficiency analysis preoccupies the literature in corporate law. This literature,
however, has focused on the question of whether ‘‘competition’’ between the
states for the ‘‘business’’ of supplying corporate charters and an associated
law of corporations to incorporating firms will lead to efficiency. In one view
(Winter, 1977; Dodd and Leftwich, 1980; Fischel, 1982), this competition, by
analogy towhat happenswhen private firms compete to provide goods, is a ‘‘race
to the top,’’ achieving efficiency as states with less efficient offerings lose out to
those withmore efficient offerings. In other views (Cary, 1974; Bebchuk, 1992),
there are imperfections in this competition that impede the race (such as agency
problems, which cause states to cater to the interests of managers, who control
the incorporation decision, rather than shareholders), sometimes leading to
a ‘‘race to the bottom’’ and a need for federal as opposed to state regulation.
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In a recent version of this view, Bebchuk and Ferrell (2001) suggest that, at least
with respect to takeover law, competition between the states has resulted in the
states all essentially offering the same, suboptimal, restrictions on takeovers.
Regardless of whether one adopts the optimistic or pessimistic view, what
this literature overlooks is the option of private, rather than public, provision
of corporate law. Even more fundamentally, it has generally not taken care to
examine the nature of ‘‘competition’’ between states and legislatures and the
aptness of analogizing state competition to competition between profit-
maximizing firms.1 Most of the attention has been focused on demand-side
imperfections, namely agency problems between managers and shareholders.
Even when attention is paid to the nature of supply-side pressures and possible
imperfections, as in Macey and Miller’s (1983) interest-group model of com-
petition, the assumption persists that the revenues generated by a state’s cor-
porate law regime (whether collected by the treasury or by local corporate
lawyers), on the margin, spur the ‘‘state’’ to exploit opportunities to increase
revenue by making corporate law more attractive to incorporating firms.
Finally, as some commentators have pointed out (Bebchuk and Ferrell, 2001),
even the empirical tests suggesting that there are positive returns to incorpo-
rating inDelaware as opposed to other ‘‘competing’’ states (Dodd andLeftwich,
1980; Romano, 1985; Daines, 2001) do not support the conclusion that com-
petition between the states leads to efficient corporate law; they only support the
conclusion that Delaware’s corporate law may be less inefficient than others.2
Is it in fact the case that competition between the states can lead to efficient
production of corporate law? What are the incentives facing courts and legis-
latures to produce efficient law? Even if it were shareholders rather than man-
agers making the selection of state of incorporation, what basis is there for
thinking that states will behave like private profit-maximizing firms, allowing
us the benefit of the welfare theorems that indicate that ‘‘competition’’ will lead
to socially optimal outcomes?
This article takes a first step toward addressing these questions, explicitly
modeling the efficiency characteristics of public versus private provision of
corporate law. By ‘‘private provision of corporate law,’’ we mean profit-
maximizing firms providing for a fee the package of services that we conven-
tionally think of as ‘‘corporate law’’: bringing a corporation into existence as
1. Participants in this literature have at times observed that the specifics of state ‘‘competition’’
are poorly defined. Romano (1985) points out that those writing in this literature ‘‘never clearly
specify what the states are actually supposed to be maximizing, such as net or gross revenues’’
(p. 228, n3). Easterbrook and Fischel (1991) raise the question of what legislators’ motives are and
observe that ‘‘no legislator can capture the benefits to the state of increased revenues’’ (216).
Bebchuk (1992) discusses legislators’ (and other state actors’) incentives and concedes that they
may be multi-faceted and complex, but concludes that it is nonetheless appropriate to assume that
‘‘a state’s interest in attracting incorporations shapes the behavior of the individuals actually in-
volved in the state’s lawmaking process’’ (1454).
2. There are reasons to question even this inference, as these tests may not adequately account
for the confounding fact that firms that (re)incorporate in Delaware and enjoy abnormal positive
returns do so because of factors other than the quality of Delaware corporation law.
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a legally recognized entity distinct from its shareholders, supplying the rules
and regulations governing the operation of the entity, and administering a sys-
tem of dispute resolution and adjudication. Thus we want to distinguish private
provision of corporate law from the possible roles that private actors—such as
bar associations, law reform commissions, academics, etc.—might play in
public provision.3 Even if corporate lawyers write a state’s corporate code,
the decision to implement that code is ultimately governed by the incentives
and behavior of public state actors.
We model the incentives of legislators as public providers of corporate law
explicitly as incentives to capture private benefits, which are accomplished by
the costly transformation of public revenues into increased reelection chances.
We allow for the (realistic) possibility that there is not a single optimal cor-
porate regime: we assume that incorporating firms are heterogenous with re-
spect to the ideal regime.4 Finally, we allow for learning about the distribution
of incorporating firms with respect to ideal corporate law and innovation by
corporate law providers to meet the needs of these firms.
We demonstrate that under plausible conditions (most importantly, that the
marginal private benefit arising from an increase in public revenues is even-
tually outweighed by the marginal private cost to the legislator of achieving
that benefit), competition between the states does not lead to the optimal cor-
porate law regimes, and that the regimes resulting from competition among
private profit-maximizing entities achieve greater efficiency. Specifically,
we demonstrate that states will tend to emulate one another: state competition
will lead to both insufficiently diverse corporate law offerings and offerings
that will generally bear no relation to the optimal structure for incorporating
firms. Moreover, state providers of corporate law will fail to learn about the
distribution of incorporating firms and will not innovate to produce regimes
that better suit the needs of these firms. Private providers, on the other hand,
while perhaps also failing to provide the socially optimal set of regulations,
will have a greater tendency to differentiate their offerings and hence will bet-
ter serve the needs of a heterogeneous population of incorporating firms. They
will also realize greater incentives to learn and design new regimes tailored to
the distribution of incorporating firms.
Our results highlight the fundamental insight that ‘‘competition’’ between
public entities such as legislatures cannot be simply analogized to competition
between private entities. Legislatures in our model do face an incentive to cap-
ture the business of incorporating firms and, especially, fear losing that busi-
ness. But the rewards they face—satisfying voters and campaign contributors
and hence achieving reelection—do not create the kind of marginal incentives
that lead to efficient offerings. Legislators only benefit from increasing public
revenues from corporate law to the extent that they are able to transform those
3. For a discussion of the role of private actors, such as the ALI and UCCSL in the production
of law, see Snyder, 2003.
4. The regulatory competition literature has sometimes noted the question of heterogeneity
among incorporating firms. See Posner and Scott, 1980 and Baysinger and Butler, 1985.
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revenues into private benefits. The marginal benefit to them is not equal to the
marginal increase in net revenues (profits). Moreover, because we believe it is
plausible to assume that the marginal benefit to the legislator is eventually
zero, in equilibrium, legislators are uninterested in competing for additional
revenues. This is a fundamental distinction between state ‘‘competition’’ and
private competition and is the basis for our conclusion that private entities will,
in general, offer more efficient corporate law regimes.
One obvious question that arises from our analysis is why, as a practical
matter, our thesis matters, at least insofar as private provision has not already
become effectively the norm in corporate law. Black (1990), for example, has
argued that corporate law is in many ways trivial, since the immutable rules of
corporate law simply mimic hypothetical market outcomes, and the remainder
are merely default terms that can be avoided by advance planning. While these
claims are plausible, our analysis parts company with them in at least two
ways. First, and most centrally, some critical immutable rules of corporate
law (limited liability and corporate legal personality, among others) have
unique effects on the welfare of third parties, and as such must be subject
to recognition by the state; they cannot be governed exclusively by private con-
tracting among shareholders (see, e.g., Hansmann and Kraakman, 2000).
Relatedly, the state’s recognition of organizations incorporated in private
regimes is required in order to implement various state regulatory schemes,
such as securities fraud law and tax law. Other mandatory requirements (such
as board management rights, fiduciary duties of loyalty, and ‘‘constituency’’
statutes) could conceivably be left up to private contracting, but many states
(perhaps by tradition) do not allow such manipulations. More importantly, it is
far from self-evident that these mandatory characteristics of corporate law
merely mimic the market, and indeed it is virtually impossible (as Black,
1990, concedes) to test this claim empirically. Consequently, the intuitive
plausibility of the market-mimicking claim rests, in our view, largely on
the assertion that state provision of corporate law functions like a private
market. Our analysis gives a basis for skepticism about this claim: we dem-
onstrate that public providers may not, in fact, produce the corporate law that
the market prefers.
Second, even for those aspects of existing state-provided corporate law that
are unambiguously default rules (e.g., governance schemes, voting procedures,
frequency of board meetings, and the like), our analysis may still hold some
important implications. Indeed, because of the centrality of the immutable
characteristics of corporate status noted above, it is necessary for a company
to first choose a state within which to incorporate, and only then to contemplate
adapting the corporate code’s default terms to match explicit corporate needs.
This process, however, is costly, and the cost increases in both the number and
magnitude of such deviations. Because of this cost of contracting, then, there is
still a transaction cost efficiency rationale for states to offer selections that are
likely to be a good match (at least on average) for the strata of firms that they
serve. It is therefore important to consider whether the incentives of public
providers (as compared with private providers) would lead them to care about
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effecting such matches. As our analysis below demonstrates, we have reason to
be skeptical here as well.
Our analysis proceeds as follows. We develop the model in Section 2 and
prove our results for the static case in Section 3 and the dynamic (learning and
innovation) case in Section 4. Section 5 interprets our results, discusses their
generalization and limitation, and offers concluding remarks.
2. A Model of Law Provision
In this section, we develop our arguments more formally, using a familiar spa-
tial competition framework drawn from the industrial organizations literature.
Our principal aim here is to demonstrate more precisely how, insofar as public
providers have incentives that diverge from simple profit maximization, reg-
ulatory competition among public providers of corporate law might differ
considerably from that which would be provided privately. We identify both
short- and long-run differences between regulatory and private competition
predicted by the model. In the short run, public providers produce substantive
law that differs considerably from that which private competitors would offer,
favoring emulation over product differentiation. In the long run, emulation
among public providers leads to less equilibrium learning than private provi-
sion would generate, hampering states’ ability to tailor their offerings over
time to ‘‘fit’’ the characteristics of the regulated population.
A central presumption of our analysis is that the ‘‘optimal’’ organizational
structure is not uniform across firms. Some companies, for example, may face
serious risks at the macro-organizational level (such as interest rate fluctua-
tions), and overall company performance thereby turns on management’s abil-
ity to react quickly and confidently to such shocks. Other companies, however,
may face a different portfolio of organizational desiderata, in which the value
of rapid flexibility is small relative to the value of placing constraints on self-
serving managers. Different organizational contexts, different informational
structures, different degrees of firm size, scope, and complexity all are factors
that should influence both the opportunity for principal-agent failures in man-
agement and the costs associated with constraints on and intervention in
(including the potential for judicial review of) firm management.5 This inter-
firm substantive heterogeneity is, moreover, likely to spawn heterogeneous
definitions of what an optimal corporate law would look like. For flexibility-
valuing firms, an optimal corporate law would tend to defer to managerial dis-
cretion, by (for example) adopting an extreme form of the business judgment
rule that emancipates managers to act expeditiously. Such a rule may also be
optimal for firm structures in which the potential for judicial review of mana-
gerial decision making leads to costly distortions in information processing or
hierarchies. In firms necessitating more managerial discipline or in which the
risk of public disclosure of firm information is less problematic, an optimal reg-
ulatory regime would accord more scrutiny to managerial behavior, giving
5. See, e.g., Milgrom and Roberts, 1992:538–84 (discussing this type of heterogeneity among
well-known corporations).
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shareholders considerable oversight powers and the ability to trumpmanagerial
decisions.
This heterogeneity is important for a number of reasons. Principally, it sug-
gests that the process of inter-jurisdictional competition (to the extent that it
exists) is part of a larger mechanism for matching firms to their best organi-
zational governance structure. Viewed from this perspective, there are at least
three ways a company can attempt to perfect a match between available gov-
ernance regimes and organizational characteristics: (1) It can adapt its oper-
ations to match the existing offerings among states; (2) it can hope that states
will cater to it by learning (perhaps over time) the characteristics of the pop-
ulation; or (3) it can contract into its own set of provisions (to the extent that
state law allows it to do so). Any model that we analyze, therefore, should
allow for any of these possibilities (or some permutation), in understanding
the structural characteristics of inter-jurisdictional competition.
2.1 The Demand Side: Incorporating Firms
Consider a population of profit-maximizing firms, independently selecting
from among a limited menu of standard-form corporate governance regimes
that they might adopt. This is the decision of ‘‘where’’ to incorporate and the
regime governing the corporate charter. Throughout what follows, assume that
all firms within the relevant population wish to incorporate, and that they place
a relatively large value on so doing. Given this desire, the problem that each
firm faces is one of finding the best fit, i.e., the corporate governance regime
that best matches the organization’s specific fundamental needs.
To represent this dilemma conceptually, we posit (as noted above) that firms
are heterogeneous in nature, and that each firm can be identified with a unique
governance regime that is ‘‘ideal’’ for that firm. In order to capture the flavor of
this regulatory environment, suppose that the universe of possible governance
structures can be represented by a one-dimensional interval, ranging—for
example—from highly deferential (on the left boundary) to highly invasive
(on the right).6 Because of the uniqueness of this ideal point, each individual
firm can be associated with an organizational type, which we denote by
x 2 ½0; 1: When matched up with its ideal governance form, each firm would
be willing to pay up to K > 0 dollars to procure governance services. For the
purposes of this article, we make the simplifying assumption that K is large
relative to other parameters of the model.7
Since the number of governance forms available in practice may be limited,
a representative firm must factor in at least two considerations when deciding
which governance regime to select. First, it will care about the price (which can
6. To be sure, most governance regimes have more than one relevant dimension, and it may be
possible to generalize our framework to multiple dimensions. We resist that temptation here, how-
ever, both for the sake of tractability and to expose core intuitions.
7. This assumption ensures that firms will consume from some provider. It is possible to re-
lax this assumption without changing our qualitative results, but at the cost of some additional
notation.
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include chartering fees, anticipated dispute resolution costs such as legal fees,
and even taxes when the provider is public)8 that the provider charges for a firm
to organize thereunder. All else held constant, regimes that charge low prices
are more attractive than those that charge high fees. Second, the firm will care
about howwell the governance scheme it chooses ‘‘fits’’ with its organizational
type. Explicitly, should a firm of type x choose an organizational structure of
type a 6¼ x, the firm must incur a cost to remedy the mismatch between its
innate organizational needs and the chosen governance regime. One way of
doing so is to reshape its authority relationships to track that which is envi-
sioned in the governance regime; alternatively, the firm may hold its organi-
zational structure constant and either run the risk of inappropriate (suboptimal)
legal interventions or expend costs, if possible, to ‘‘contract around’’ the rules
provided by the governance regime, supplementing them with more tailored
terms.9
In either case, regardless of whether the firm adapts itself to fit the gover-
nance structure or vice versa, its effort is assumed to come at a cost sðx aÞ2;
where s > 0. Note that this adaptation cost increases in the (squared) distance
between the governance scheme and the firm’s type.10 All told, then, if the
provider of governance scheme ai charges a price of pi for its chartering
services, the total cost to the firm of type x adopting this structure will be
pi þ s  ðx aiÞ2:
Thus, if it chooses to incorporate, each firm will do so with the provider that
imposes the lowest expected cost. To illustrate, suppose that two providers, A1
and A2, offered governance/price packages of (a1, p1) and (a2, p2), respec-
tively, and assume (without loss of generality) that a1  a2. A firm with ideal
structure x would strictly favor incorporating with A1 rather than A2 if p1þ
s  ðx a1Þ2 < p2 þ s  ðx a2Þ2: If a1 ¼ a2, this implies that the firm incor-
porates with whichever provider has a lower price, unless p1 ¼ p2, in which
case the firm randomizes equally between the two providers. If a1 6¼ a2, then
a firm that chooses to incorporate will do so with A1 if the following holds:
x < x*[
ðp2  p1Þ þ s½ða2Þ2  ða1Þ2
2sða2  a1Þ ð1Þ
8. To keep our comparison with private provision realistic, we can imagine that states charge
corporations fees or taxes to recapture the cost of the corporations’ use of the state corporate law
and judicial institutions. See Kahan and Kamar, 2001.
9. Note that this formulation of the problem is broad enough to account for either an immutable
or a default corporate form. For immutable rules, the cost incurred is solely the cost of mismatch
between the ideal corporate form and the one provided. For default rules, the cost reflects the
minimum of the mismatch cost and the transaction cost of altering the default rule to mirror one’s
own ideal firm type.
10. The assumption of quadratic costs is standard in models of spatial competition and is
largely adopted for tractability purposes. For a discussion, see Tirole, 1989:279–80. The equilibria
of our model—with private providers located at the ends of the interval and public providers
located at the same point on the interval—hold for linear costs as well.
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and with A2 if x > x*. (Should x ¼ x*, we shall assume that the firm random-
izes, incorporating with each provider with probability 1
2
:)
Many conventional models of spatial competition (e.g., Hotelling, 1929;
Salop, 1979) assume that the distribution of customers is common knowledge.
Such an assumption is a bit extreme for the regulatory competition we envision
here, since one critical question in this debate is how much innovation (if any)
providers produce as they learn over time about the preferences of the com-
munities they regulate. Thus, rather than assume the distribution of organiza-
tional types to be known with certainty, we suppose instead that firm types
are distributed according to a CDF denoted by FðxjHÞ; where H ¼ fh1; h2g
represents a distributional parameter that itself is a random variable, with
associated conditional density function f ðxjHÞ:
The realized value of H is meant to embody where the bulk of firms are
‘‘located’’ in regulatory space, and the fact that H is itself a random variable
reflects the notion that providers are not fully informed ex ante about this lo-
cation (but might learn about it over time). To keep things analytically trac-
table, we make three simplifying assumptions about the structure FðxjHÞ
consistent with these notions. First, we assume that the true population of firms
is distributed along one of two partitioning sub-intervals of [0,1], each having
length 1
2
: Thus, if H ¼ h1, the distribution is ‘‘skewed’’ toward the lower sub-
interval of the unit interval, so that all firms are located between 0 and 1
2
: Sec-
ond, we suppose that viewed ex ante, each realization hk occurs with equal
probability 1
2
: And finally, we assume that regardless of which value of H
obtains, the population of firms is distributed uniformly along the correspond-
ing subinterval. (All of these assumptions can be simplified without substan-
tially changing our results.)11 Formally, then, for any k 2 f1; 2g; the density of
x conditional on hk takes the form
f ðxjhkÞ ¼ 2 if x 2
k1
2
; k
2
 
0 else
:

ð2Þ
In the absence of information about the realization of H, the unconditional
density of x is simply the expectation of f ðxjhkÞ over all realizations of H:
f ðxÞ[EH½ f ðxjhkÞ ¼ 1 if x 2 ½0; 10 else ;

ð3Þ
which corresponds to a uniform ‘‘expected’’ distribution of firms along the
unit interval.
11. In particular, it is possible to generalize the analysis into more general distribution func-
tions, asymmetric (and even overlapping) supports for each realization hk, and asymmetric prob-
ability distributions for each hk. What is key for our results, however, is that the distributional
supports for at least two of the realizations of H must be disjoint. Moreover, it would be possible
to generalize our approach even further, to distributional families whose supports are all overlap-
ping with one another, so long as each firm’s maximal willingness to pay for access to its ideal
corporate structure (reflected by the parameter K) is not ‘‘too large.’’ Such an assumption is equiv-
alent to an exit option that firms have should the price of incorporating grow too large (such as
forming a sole proprietorship, general/limited partnership, LLC, LLP, and so forth).
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2.2 Private Providers
Private providers have a conventional maximand in our model.We assume that
private providers operate to maximize their total expected variable profits. Ex-
plicitly, each firm i chooses a location ai and a price pi to maximize its net
profits. Each unit of output (i.e., set of corporate governance services) that
the provider produces comes at a marginal cost of c, which we assume to
be constant across firms. LetDiðai; pi; ai; pi; hÞ denote the demand generated
by firm i when the firm’s competitors offer (possibly vector-valued) combi-
nations of locations and prices of ai and pi, respectively, and the population
parameter is h. Note that this implies the following equations for demand:
D1ð:Þ ¼
Fðx*jhÞ if a1 6¼ a2
1 if a1 ¼ a2 and p1 < p2
0 if a1 ¼ a2 and p1 > p2
1
2
if a1 ¼ a2 and p1 ¼ p2
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
D2ð:Þ ¼
1 Fðx*jhÞ if a1 6¼ a2
0 if a1 ¼ a2 and p1 < p2
1 if a1 ¼ a2 and p1 > p2
1
2
if a1 ¼ a2 and p1 ¼ p2
8>><
>>:
9>>=
>>;
: ð4Þ
Consequently, firm i’s expected profit is given by
EH½piðai; piÞ[EH½ðpi  cÞ  Diðai; pi; ai; pi; hÞ; ð5Þ
which we assume to be the maximand of private providers. And thus, each
provider takes its competitors’ strategies as given and solves the following:
Max
fai;pig
EH½piðai; piÞ: ð6Þ
2.3 Public Providers
The central premise of the regulatory competition literature is that legislators
(and other public actors) effectively behave like profit-maximizing firms,
choosing laws and regulations that maximize state ‘‘profits.’’12 Our principal
contribution is to challenge that assumption.
There is no settled model of what motivates legislators, and in particular
there is substantial disagreement about the extent to which legislators are mo-
tivated by the public interest as opposed to their own private benefits, such as
reelection or the pursuit of private policy goals, in exercising their public of-
fice. The regulatory competition literature has not attempted to specify what
motivates legislators in choosing corporate law regimes beyond the assump-
tion that legislators will choose a regime that maximizes the state’s net
12. Kahan and Kamar (2002) have challenged the assumption that there is any money to be
made by the state through corporate law. We assume that legislators could, if they chose, generate
substantial revenues through corporate law and instead focus on their incentives to do so.
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revenues (taxes and other state revenues minus public expenditures). This does
not adequately account for legislator incentives, however, because it does not
explain why legislators gain utility from increases in state revenues. Unlike the
shareholders of a firm, these are not revenues that legislators can directly (cost-
lessly) convert to their own private consumption.
The implicit model in the regulatory competition literature could be a public
interest model: legislators are motivated by their obligation to improve the
fiscal position of the state. But if legislators were truly motivated by public
interest, it would be hard to explain why they choose legal regimes that max-
imize revenues rather than simply choosing the optimal legal regime from a
social welfare point of view. The very point of the regulatory competition
literature, however, seems to be that ‘‘states’’ won’t choose the optimal legal
regime unless they have a monetary incentive to do so, namely generating tax
and other revenues. Clearly, then, the regulatory competition model has in
mind something other than legislators acting on the basis of pure public in-
terest. Once we recognize that ‘‘states’’ do not make legal regime choices,
and that legislators (and other public actors, such as courts) do, however,
we cannot simply appeal to the increase in state revenues as the ‘‘private’’
benefit that spurs regulatory competition. We need to explain how state rev-
enues are converted into private benefits for legislators.
The central feature of our model of public providers of corporate law is an
assumption that it is costly for legislators to convert state revenues into private
benefits. It is the costliness of capturing private benefits from state revenues
that constitutes the essential difference between public and private competition
and explains why we predict that public providers will not do as well as private
providers in generating welfare-improving corporate law regimes.
To make this concrete, we adopt one of the conventional assumptions from
the positive political economy literature (see, e.g., Mayhew, 1973, Fiorina,
1977) and assume that legislators derive utility from holding office and are
thus motivated to achieve reelection. Our results do not depend on the partic-
ular private benefit obtained by the legislator; what is important is the assump-
tion that private benefits are not equal to public revenues, but rather are
procured from public revenues at some private cost to the legislator. Thus
we can reformulate the interpretation of the model to replace reelection with
the pursuit of personal policy preferences or personal consumption (such as the
enjoyment of prestige or status). We discuss the model in terms of reelection
only for concreteness.
Specifically, we assume that each state i has a single legislator Aiwho selects
the state’s corporate governance regime and sets the price (taxes and other
fees) simultaneously with her counterparts in other states. (Note that by assum-
ing a single legislator in each state we bias our result toward the conclusion of
the regulatory competition literature, which assumes that a state acts like a uni-
fied decision maker.) A legislator who achieves reelection enjoys private ben-
efits U > 0; a legislator who loses office receives U ¼ 0.
Let qi be the probability of reelection. We can interpret the standard reg-
ulatory competition model to be an assumption that qi is a function of the
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state’s net corporate law revenues, pi, and we adopt this assumption also. We
also assume, however, that public revenues increase reelection chances qi only
through the expenditure of costly effort on the part of the legislator. The leg-
islator may have to publicize her accomplishments to voters in order to sway
their votes. She may have to entertain lobbying efforts or engage in research to
determine where to most effectively (from a reelection/campaign finance per-
spective) direct public expenditures paid for with corporate law revenues. Let ri
be this cost. We assume that ri is also a function of net revenues, pi. We assume
that qi (pi) and ri (pi) are both continuous and twice differentiable on [0, 1).
We can then define a function, wi, the net private benefit realized by the
legislator as a result of generating net corporate law revenues:
wiðpiÞ ¼ qiðpiÞ U  riðpiÞ: ð7Þ
We impose a condition on this private benefit function, namely that there exists
a finite threshold (denoted by pi), such that for values of pi below pi; wi is
nondecreasing, and beyond pi; wi is nonincreasing. Specifically, for pi > pi
q#iðpiÞ U  r#iðpiÞ; ð8Þ
that is, the marginal private cost of increasing reelection chances equals or
exceeds the marginal private (reelection) benefit to the legislator. Thus beyond
pi; net private benefit is non-increasing in public revenues, and we can define
wi; the maximum net private benefit that the legislator can obtain from gen-
erating corporate law revenues for the state.
The condition we impose on wi can be motivated in several ways. The sim-
plest is to posit a world in which corporate law revenues are, at their maximum,
so small as to have negligible effect on a legislator’s reelection chances. Kahan
and Kamar (2002) suggest this may be the case, providing evidence that ‘‘no
state stands to gain meaningful tax revenues or legal business from chartering
firms.’’ In our model, this would amount to q#iðpiÞ ¼ 0 for all pi or pi ¼ 0:
Because we want to take the regulatory competition claim seriously, in the
sense that legislators could face an incentive to improve their corporate
law offerings in order to improve their reelection chances, we assume
pi > 0 ð9Þ
and define w ¼ w(0). Then condition (8) implies that
w < w: ð10Þ
Even if some small reelection gains may be achieved from generating cor-
porate law revenues, however, it may plausibly be the case that the cost of
conveying this information to voters or potential campaign contributors
in a meaningful and effective way quickly exceeds the marginal benefits of
doing so (pi ¼ e).
Condition (8) can also be anchored in a median voter model (e.g., Black,
1948). In a full information model without uncertainty and with voters arrayed
along a single-peaked dimension, the legislator achieves reelection with cer-
tainty at the point at which the median voter decides to vote for her. If the
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median voter is motivated by the legislator’s ability to generate revenues for
the state (used to purchase public goods, for example), then there is a level of
revenue pi at which the median voter will choose the legislator over her chal-
lengers. This version of the median voter model would imply qi is a step func-
tion equal to 0 up to pi and equal to 1 at and beyond pi:
This median voter model would satisfy condition (8) even in the absence of
costs associated with efforts to communicate with the median voter and hence
obtain his or her vote. More generally, however, if there is uncertainty about
the median voter’s behavior and preferences, it is plausible to assume that the
probability of securing the median voter’s vote increases as pi grows but that
simultaneously the cost of efforts to secure that vote also increases, such that
eventually the marginal cost exceeds the marginal benefit. These costs may
come from straightforward advertising costs, which increase on the margin
as the effort is made to sway voters who are more and more demanding.
The costs may come from the limited capacity of the legislator to devote effort
to personally conveying information to voters through campaign speeches,
appearances, and so on.
In a more general model, with voting and campaign contributions dependent
on a multitude of factors, costs associated with transforming public revenues
into private benefits may also increase on the margin, and so exceed the mar-
ginal benefit, as a legislator seeking reelection is forced to go after voters or
contributors that are further removed from his or her core constituency. These
costs may come directly from the cost of communicating with a group that is
less inclined to hear one’s message or is distrustful: some voters, for example,
probably cannot be swayed to vote for some legislators no matter how effective
they are at raising public revenues. These costs may also come indirectly from
the need to juggle greater conflicts across constituencies—trading one group’s
interests against another’s and hence incurring a cost with the losing group.
Marginal costs of improving reelection chances may also begin to exceed
marginal benefits in a world in which powerful constituencies are created that
pressure a legislator to compromise other goals, such as the achievement of
privately preferred policy outcomes. This may be a particularly important
source of distortion for legislators with respect to corporate law. When a state
attracts increased business from corporations, it not only generates increased
public revenues through taxes and other fees, it also generates increased private
income for lawyers in the state. Corporate lawyers are thus an increasingly im-
portant source of campaign funds, and an increasingly powerful constituency.
Regardless of which interpretation one chooses, the legislator’s problem can
be expressed as one of selecting a governance and pricing regime to maximize
her expected net benefits from reelection. Equivalently, each public provider
takes its competitors’ strategies as given and solves the following:
Max
fai;pig
EH½wiðpiðai; piÞÞ: ð11Þ
For simplicity, in what follows we assume that the providers are symmetric,
such that wið:Þ ¼ wð:Þ and pi ¼ p for all i.
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3. Static Equilibrium
We now turn to the derivation of the socially optimal corporate law regime
and the equilibrium offerings of private and state providers. We begin with
the static one-period solution in which the distribution of incorporating firms
is unknown, and we assume that there are two potential providers. We denote
these providers as a1 and a2 and assume (without loss of generality) that a1 a2.
In analyzing the equilibria of the game (particularly for the case of public
providers), it may sometimes become necessary to select from among multiple
equilibria for the game. In such instances, we shall impose a (relatively intu-
itive) Pareto criterion as to the payoffs of the providers for selecting among
these equilibria. This criterion is embodied in Assumption P below.
Assumption P. Consider an equilibrium of the location/pricing game for the
provision of corporate law, denoted by fa1*; a2*; p1*; p2*g yielding payoffs to the
providers of m1* and m2*: Such an equilibrium is selected with positive proba-
bility if and only if there exists no alternative equilibrium fa#1; a#2; p#1; p#2g yield-
ing payoffs m#1 and m#2 such that m#i  mi* "i, and m#j > mj* for some j 2 f1, 2g.
The rationale behind Assumption P is quite simple. It essentially asserts that
the most plausible equilibria (from the providers’ perspective) are the ones that
are not Pareto-dominated, and that providers will always be able to coordinate
on one such equilibrium rather than selecting an alternative that makes no pro-
vider better off, while making some provider(s) worse off. This assumption is
appropriate for our goal of testing the efficiency claims of the regulatory com-
petition literature in that the literature assumes states act to maximize state
revenues. Note that Assumption P is relatively weak in the sense that it does
not dictate a choice among equilibria on the Pareto efficient domain. On the
other hand, the assumption applies only to the payoffs of the providers and not
to that of the consumers. And thus Assumption P may nonetheless select
against socially efficient allocations once consumer welfare is taken into ac-
count. This too is appropriate for testing the claims of the regulatory compe-
tition literature, which assumes that states require a monetary incentive in the
form of revenue and do not act in the public interest by simply selecting op-
timal corporate law regimes.
3.1 Socially Optimal Locations
Consider first the social planner’s problem of optimally locating two corporate
governance regimes in the static version of the game. The social planner
wishes to choose locations fa1; a2g; and a correspondence a :x/fa1; a2g
to minimize the expected social costs due to adaptation, or
Min
a1;a2;aðxÞ2fa1;a2g
EfH;xg½s  ðx aðxÞÞ2: ð12Þ
Analysis of this problem leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 1. In the absence of knowledge about the realized value of H,
and a regime with two providers, the socially optimal locations (in the sense of
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minimizing total expected adaptation costs) are at a1 ¼ 14 and a2 ¼ 34; and the
socially optimal assignment rule is
aðxÞ ¼ a1 if x 
1
2
a2 else
:

ð13Þ
Proof. Since the prices paid are merely transfer payments, the total social
cost of a firm with ideal point x incorporating at ai is given by
S ¼ s  ðx aiÞ2: ð14Þ
Thus, for a given a1 and a2, the social planner would choose a correspondence
that assigns the firm to a1 if and only if
s  ðx a1Þ2  s  ðx a2Þ2
5
x  a1 þ a2
2
: ð15Þ
At the optimum, given that absence of knowedge about H’s realized value
implies that firms are uniformly distributed, it must be the case that the max-
imum distance traveled by any firm is the same for each location and for firms
on either side of each location. This implies that
a1 ¼ a1 þ a2
2
 a1 ¼ 1 a2:
Solving yields a1 ¼ 14 and a2 ¼ 34: n
From a social welfare perspective, variety is clearly desirable, so that in-
corporating firms can choose the location that is least costly for them to adopt.
At the same time, Proposition 1 makes clear that there can be such a thing as
‘‘too much’’ differentiation. In particular, it is not optimal to offer corporate
governance packages that are polar opposites of each other. Under these
regimes, any incorporating firm whose needs lay somewhere in the middle
would bear an unnecessarily large cost of adapting to either extreme offering.
3.2 Private Providers
Having set the baseline for comparison reflected in the social planner’s problem,
consider now how private providers will locate in equilibrium. Note first that if
a1¼ a2, then the firms will compete only as to price (in Bertrand fashion), driv-
ing price to marginal cost c, and profits to zero. Suppose instead that a1 6¼ a2 (as
we will show holds in the equilibrium). Recall that the expected density (that is,
in the absence of knowledge about the realization of h) of firm types is uniform
on [0,1]. Then we can write provider 1’s expected demand as
EH½D1ða1; p1; a2; p2; hÞ ¼ EH½Fðx*jhÞ
¼ x*
¼ a1 þ a2  a1
2
þ ðp2  p1Þ
2sða2  a1Þ: ð16Þ
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Its profits are therefore given by
p1ðp1; a1jc; p2; a2Þ ¼ ðp1  cÞD1ðp1; a1jc; p2; a2Þ
¼ ðp1  cÞ a1 þ a2  a1
2
þ ðp2  p1Þ
2sða2  a1Þ
 
: ð17Þ
Similarly, firm 2 will face expected profits of
p2ðp2; a2jc; p1; a1Þ ¼ ðp2  cÞD2ðp2; a2jc; p1; a1Þ
¼ ðp2  cÞ 1 a1  a2  a1
2
 ðp2  p1Þ
2sða2  a1Þ
 
: ð18Þ
Each firm will choose a location and price pair (ai, pi) to maximize profits,
which in turn yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2. In the absence of knowledge about the true value of h, pri-
vate profit-maximizing providers will locate at a1 ¼ 0 and a2 ¼ 1, and will
charge prices of p1 ¼ p2 ¼ ðcþ sÞ: This equilibrium is unique.
Proof. (See d’Aspremont et al. 1979) Suppose first a1 and a2 are fixed, and
consider firm 1’s choice of price. Maximizing p1ðp1jc; p2Þ with respect to p1
and p2ðp1jc; p2Þ with respect to p2 yields reaction functions:
p1 ¼ 1
2
p2 þ 1
2
c 1
2
sa21 þ
1
2
sa22
p2 ¼ 1
2
p1 þ 1
2
cþ 1
2
sa21 
1
2
sa22 þ sa2  sa1:
Solving for p1 and p2 yields
p1* ¼ cþ sða2  a1Þ 1þ a1 þ a2  1
3
 
p2* ¼ cþ sða2  a1Þ 1 a1 þ a2  1
3
 
:
Under these solutions, denote the maximized profits for given a1 and a2 for
each provider as p1* and p2*:Now consider provider 1’s maximization problem
with respect to location. By the envelope theorem,
@p1*
@a1
¼ ðp1* cÞ @D1
@a1
þ @D1
@p2
@p2*
@a1
 
:
Substituting for p1* and p2* yields
@p1*
@a1
¼ ðp1* cÞ a2  3a1  2
6ða2  a1Þ
 
< 0 " a1:
On Public versus Private Provision of Corporate Law 429
This implies that profits are always increasing as provider 1 moves to the end-
point, 0. Similarly, profits for provider 2 are always increasing as it moves to
the endpoint, 1. Prices at these locations are p1 ¼ p2 ¼ ðcþ sÞ: n
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. A provider’s choice of
location has two competing effects. On the one hand, moving away from
one’s competitor can reduce the size of the market served. On the other hand,
increasing the distance between providers implies that a provider can charge
a higher price because customers have a longer distance to travel to the com-
petitor location. Proposition 2 demonstrates that when incorporating firms are
uniformly distributed and face quadratic costs, the price effect dominates the
market share effect, and thus profits are increasing in the distance to the com-
petitor provider. This drives both private providers to maximize the distance
between them, resulting in the corner solution fa1; a2g ¼ f0; 1g:13 Compared
to the social optimum, then, private competition can lead to excessive product
differentiation among competitors.
3.3 Public Providers
Now consider the game where corporate law is provided by public entities such
as states. Denoting pi ¼ (pi  c)  Di and once again assuming that a1  a2,
legislator A1’s expected utility is given by EH½wðp1Þ and A2’s is given by
EH½wðp2Þ: Note once again that under condition (8 ), although legislators
may receive some marginal private benefit from raising state revenues, that
marginal benefit is zero or negative once revenue exceeds p: Analysis of this
strategic setting yields the following:
Proposition 3. In the absence of knowledge about the realized value of h
and two public providers, and assuming condition (8) holds, all equilibria sat-
isfying Assumption P consist of pooling equilibria in which legislators emulate
each other’s offerings with a1 ¼ a2 ¼ c, where c 2 [0, 1], and charge identical
prices p1 ¼ p2 2 ½cþ 2p;K:
Proof. For existence, recall that when a1 ¼ a2 and p1 ¼ p2, D1 ¼ D2 ¼ 12.
Thus, with p1 ¼ p2 2 ½cþ 2p;K; it is clear that p1 ¼ p2 ¼ p; and therefore
U1 ¼ U2 ¼ U  qðpÞ  rðpÞ ¼ U  w: Because this is the maximal payoff that
can be achieved by each player individually, no player has an affirmative in-
centive to deviate and Assumption P is clearly satisfied.
To see that all equilibria must be in this set, observe that in any locational
pooling equilibrium with a1 ¼ a2, it must also be the case that p1 ¼ p2; if not,
one provider would earn zero profit and could do strictly better by matching (or
beating) the lower price. Moreover, the only locational pooling equilibria with
prices below cþ 2p is at p1 ¼ p2 ¼ c. To see this, note that for any posited
13. When costs are less than quadratic, the separation between may fall short of the corner
solutions stated in the text. See, e.g., Economides, 1986. What is critical for most of our argument,
however, is the existence of separation of the firms, and not the degree of that separation. This
separation persists even when providers do not fully differentiate their offerings, and even (in
a probabilistic sense) when the only equilibrium for private providers is in mixed strategies
(as is the case, for instance, when incorporating firms face linear distance costs).
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equilibrium with identical prices on the interval ðc; cþ 2pÞ; each firm has
a strict incentive to undercut the prescribed equilibrium price by some arbi-
trarily small amount e. This incentive to undercut one’s rival abates only at the
Bertrand outcome where the providers price at marginal cost. But because the
Bertrand outcome is Pareto-dominated by the set of equilibria stated in the
proposition, it is ruled out by Assumption P.
Now consider potential equilibria that involve locational separation (i.e.,
without loss of generality, a1< a2). In any such equilibrium, regardless of prices
charged, the players must split the market into two segments, in which custom-
ers on the interval [0, x*] go to provider 1 (with the remainder going to provider
2), andwhere x*2 [0, 1]. If x* 1
2
; then player 1’s payoff iswð0Þ ¼ wwhenever
h¼h2, as itwill have a zeromarket share. Similarly, if x* 12; the same is true for
player 2 whenever h ¼ h1 . Thus, regardless of x*, one of these outcomes will
occur at least half of the time, which is Pareto inferior from an ex ante stand-
point to the posited pooling equilibrium, violating Assumption P. n
The intuition and generalization behind this result underscore a key feature
of public provision. While it is true, as much of the literature on regulatory
competition assumes (see Romano, 1985), that states will be loathe to enact
laws that run the risk of being disfavored by incorporating firms, the legislative
incentive to provide ‘‘optimal’’ corporate law is truncated by the fact that legis-
lators do not enjoy any benefit from marginal profits once they have reached
the point at which the marginal cost of converting those public profits into
improved reelection chances exceeds themarginal private benefit from a higher
probability of reelection. Emulating existing offerings guarantees a 1
n
share of
the market; prices will then be set to maximize the private benefit available
from generating state revenues. Legislators can do no better by offering dif-
ferentiated corporate law regimes, and indeed, given the positive probability
that they will lose all corporate law revenues, they will, under our assumption
that corporate law revenues have some re-election benefit, do strictly worse.
Neither the public nor the private solution coincides with the social optimum
(in the sense of minimizing the summed expected costs of consumers and pro-
ducers).Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that private provision, in general,
comes closer in welfare terms. This is demonstrated in our next proposition.
Proposition 4. In the absence of information about the realized value of h,
and under Assumption P, private provision of corporate law imposes social
costs that are weakly lower than those imposed by public provision. Moreover,
for any public provision equilibrium in which c 6¼ 1
2
; private provision is
strictly preferred on a social cost basis.
Proof. Under the equilibrium with private providers, total social costs are
given byð 1
2
0
½s  ðx 0Þ2 þ c f ðxÞdxþ
ð1
1
2
½s  ðx 1Þ2 þ c f ðxÞdx ¼ 1
12
sþ c
>
s
48
þ c ðfirst bestÞ:
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Under the pooling equilibrium with public providers, total expected social
costs areð1
0
½s  ðx cÞ2 þ c f ðxÞdx ¼ s 1
3
 cþ c2
 
þ c > s
48
þ c ðfirst bestÞ:
Comparing the expected social costs for public and private provision yields
s
1
3
 cþ c2
 
 s
12
:
Note that this inequality is strict for all c 6¼ 1
2
: Thus in no instance does any
equilibrium of the public chartering game satisfying Assumption P achieve
a lower level of expected social costs than does private provision. n
Private provision, although it is distorted from the first-best by the imperfect
competition that characterizes spatial markets, nonetheless outperforms public
provision because some differentiation in regimes is better than none when
incorporating firms are, in expectation, uniformly distributed. With only a sin-
gle location to choose from under public provision, the firms that must ‘‘travel’’
the greatest distance (distort their optimal governance structure the most) will
in general have to travel farther than they would if there were two or more
differentiated providers, as there are under private provision. Only in the
special case in which public regulators all choose to locate in the middle
of the interval—in which case the maximum distance traveled is 1
2
—does pub-
lic provision match private provision in welfare terms.
4. Dynamic Equilibrium
We now turn to consider what happens when there are multiple periods and the
potential for learning the true value of h. In particular, consider a 2-period
extension of the model with no discounting, and let t 2 f1, 2g index the rel-
evant period; let ðat1; at2Þ denote the locations of the firms at each period, and let
ðpt1; pt2Þ denote the prices charged by the firms in each period. Legislators face
reelection at the end of each period.
The importance of the dynamic context in our analysis is informational. Re-
peat play creates the potential for the parties to learn about the underlying
characteristics of the population, regardless of whether they are private pro-
viders or public providers. In considering these two cases below, we assume
throughout that before choosing a second-period strategy, the providers ob-
serve the location choices, price choices, and market shares of each provider
that obtained during period 1. As before, we presume that all providers know
the distribution of F(x j h).
Proposition 5. In a dynamic regime with the potential for learning the true
value of h, it is socially optimal to adopt differentiated locations in period 1
and to learn. In particular, it is socially optimal to set a11 ¼ 14 and a12 ¼ 34 and
to charge identical prices p1 ¼ p2 ¼ p. If h ¼ h1, the optimal second-period
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locations are a21 ¼ 18 and a22 ¼ 38 . If h¼ h2, the optimal second-period locations
are a21 ¼ 58 and a22 ¼ 78:
Proof. The optimal period 1 solution, as shown in Proposition 1, is for
providers to differentiate in location. Note that anytime the firms differentiate
as to location, learning is possible so long as ðp2  p1Þ 2 ðsða22  a21Þ;
sða2  a1Þð2 a1  a2ÞÞ; so that x* is interior on (0, 1). Given that the social
planner’s static optimum stipulates (p2  p1) ¼ 0 and calls for locational sep-
aration, it cannot be improved upon in the dynamic game. Thus, the optimal
locations for the second period will depend on whether provider 1 or provider 2
serves all firms in the first period, implying h ¼ h1 or h ¼ h2 (respectively). In
period 2, firms are known to be uniformly distributed on ½0; 1
2
 or ½1
2
; 1: If dis-
tributed on ½0; 1
2
; the optimal locations are such that a21 ¼ a
2
1
þa2
2
2
 a21 ¼ 12  a21;
which implies a21 ¼ 18 and a22 ¼ 38: If distributed on ½12; 1 the optimal locations
are such that a21  12 ¼
a2
1
þa2
2
2
 a21 ¼ 1 a21; which implies a21 ¼ 58 and a22 ¼ 78:
Of importance, learning turns out to be a costless by-product of any product
differentiation that characterizes the socially optimal solution in period 1. Sim-
ilarly, it is easy to see that private profit-maximizing providers will also learn
the true value of h as a consequence of differentiation in period 1.
Proposition 6. In the dynamic regime with the potential to learn, the unique
equilibrium outcome for private profit-maximizing providers is to adopt dif-
ferentiated period 1 locations as specified in Proposition 2, and then to infer the
value of h from first-period market shares. If h¼ h1, then firm 1 will remain at
a21 ¼ 0 in period 2, while firm 2 will move to a22 ¼ 12; and the firms will charge
p21 ¼ p22 ¼ ðcþ s4Þ: If h ¼ h2, then firm 2 will remain in the same location in
period 2, while firm 1 will move to a21 ¼ 12; and the firms will charge
p21 ¼ p22 ¼ ðcþ s4Þ:
Proof. The period 1 equilibrium, as shown in Proposition 2, is for providers
to be differentiated at fa1, a2g ¼ f0, 1g. Assuming this first-period equilibrium
persists in the dynamic game (see below), the period 1 outcome would induce
precise learning about h: either provider 1 serves all firms, implying h ¼ h, or
provider 2 serves all firms, implying h ¼ h2. As such, under this posited equi-
librium, in period 2 the firms are known to be uniformly distributed on ½0; 1
2
 or
½1
2
; 1: In any of these cases, as demonstrated in Proposition 2, the incentives of
private providers is to differentiate maximally in locations within the support
of the relevant posterior distribution. This immediately yields the locations
stated in the proposition. Given that the firms always obtain the benefits of
learning when they differentiate their offerings in period 1, they can do no
better in that period than to play the static equilibrium in period 1 (which max-
imizes their static payoffs in that period.) n
As with the social planning problem, under private provision, learning is a
costless by-product of the differentiation that maximizes static profits for each
provider in the first period. The opportunity to learn creates an opportunity to
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increase profits in period 2. The intuition behind the particular result for period 2
can be seen by recognizing that when learning occurs at the end of period 1,
one of the private providers will discover that its market share exceeds 1
2
be-
cause the distribution of incorporating firms is skewed toward the corporate
regime offered by that provider. Recall that even with the expected uniform
distribution, this provider is driven to the endpoint of the interval because mar-
ginal profits are everywhere increasing in distance from the other provider.
With the actual distribution even more profitable at this point, the incentive
to increase distance remains, again driving the provider to the endpoint. More-
over, with a larger share of the distribution at this endpoint, the competitive
pressure on pricing is reduced, and so even this effect drives the provider to
increase, not decrease, distance from the competitor. On the other hand, the
provider that finds itself at the opposite end of the interval, with less than half
the market (actually zero, given our distributional assumption), now has an
incentive to move closer to the mass of the distribution.
Public providers, on the other hand, do not face an incentive to learn and
continue to emulate each other even when there is the potential to learn.
Proposition 7. In the dynamic regime with the potential to learn, under
Assumption P, public providers adopt the same undifferentiated locations
in period 1 as in Proposition 3, and each enjoys a 1
2
market share. As such,
neither is able to infer the realized value of h, and they therefore repeat the
static equilibrium in period 2.
Proof. Begin with period 2 and suppose for a contradiction that differen-
tiated locations have been chosen and thus learning has occurred in period 1. In
any full information equilibrium in period 2 satisfying Assumption P, it must
be the case that both legislators choose location and price so that p1 ¼ p2 ¼ p
because this maximizes utility and can be achieved, as we saw in Proposition 3,
by pooling and setting p1 ¼ p2  cþ 2p: Because this maximum level of util-
ity can be achieved without learning, however, differentiation in period 1 does
not increase utility in period 2. As shown in Proposition 3, under Assump-
tion P, legislators will continue to pool in period 1. n
This result follows directly from the basic result in Proposition 3, that legis-
lators have no incentive to do better than achieving the profit level that max-
imizes their private return, p: Since this target can be met without learning,
there is no incentive to learn. Even if learning does occur, legislators will con-
tinue to emulate each other and maximize the private benefit from public rev-
enues; there is no risk of being ‘‘left out’’ if other legislators choose to learn.
Our final proposition demonstrates that even in the dynamic case, private
provision always imposes strictly lower social costs than does public provision
of corporate law.
Proposition 8. In a dynamic regime with the potential for learning the true
realization of h, under Assumption P, private chartering imposes expected so-
cial costs that are strictly lower than those imposed by public chartering.
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Proof. Consider first public provision, in which the static pooling equilib-
rium is simply repeated. Under public provision, expected social costs (as
demonstrated in Proposition 4) are equal to sð1
3
 cþ c2Þ þ c in each period.
Under private provision, expected social costs in period 1 are just as in the
static case (and Proposition 4), and are equal to 1
12
sþ c: In period 2 under
private provision, however, providers learn and adjust their locations as per
Proposition 6. In the second period, then, expected social costs (as measured
ex ante) are equal to
1
3
ð 1
4
0
2½s  ðx 0Þ2 þ cdxþ
ð 1
2
1
4
2 s  x 1
2
 2
þc
" #
dx
 !
þ 1
3
ð 1
2
0
½s  ðx 0Þ2 þ cdxþ
ð1
1
2
½s  ðx 1Þ2 þ cdx
 !
þ 1
3
ð 3
4
1
2
2 s  x 1
2
 2
þc
" #
dxþ
ð1
3
4
2½s  ðx 1Þ2 þ cdx
 !
¼ 1
24
sþ c:
Thus total expected social costs under public provision exceed those attribut-
able to public provision if and only if
2s
1
3
 cþ c2
 
þ 2c > 3
24
sþ 2c:
Note that the left-hand side of the above inequality is minimized when c ¼ 1
2
:
Imposing this lower bound on the left-hand side of the above expression yields
1
6
sþ 2c > 3
24
sþ 2c;
which is clearly satisfied for all s > 0, and thus in the dynamic game, pub-
lic provision imposes a larger expected social cost regardless of the pooling
location c. n
As seen above in Proposition 6, the adaptation induced through learning
about population characteristics (i.e., h) leads the private provider at the
high-mass end of the distribution of incorporating firms to remain at the end-
point of the interval and the other private provider to move closer to the mass of
the distribution. This reduces the distance that incorporating firms have to
‘‘travel,’’ that is, the extent to which they have to deviate from their optimal
governance regime. Overall, under private provision, adaptation in the face of
information about the true value of h reduces the total traveling and hence
social costs relative to period 1. Public provision, on the other hand, shows
no adaptation and hence no gain relative to period 1. Since we have already
seen that public provision in the static case has too little differentiation relative
to private provision, it follows that when we add the potential social benefits of
learning, public provision continues to be outperformed by private provision.
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Public provision lacks differentiation and lacks learning. Both effects lead to
the superiority of private provision of corporate law.
5. Discussion and Conclusion
The analysis above spotlights at least two specific reasons that the provision of
corporate law by profit-maximizing firms can achieve greater efficiency than
when corporate law is provided by public entities. In the static one-shot case,
private entities offer differentiated regimes for a heterogeneous population of
incorporating firms, which is closer to the first-best than the emulation ex-
hibited by public regulators. Public regulators motivated by private benefits
essentially act in a risk-averse fashion: they can maximize the reelection
(or other private benefit) payoff from generating state revenues by emulating
the offerings of other public regulators and see no benefit to differentiation.
In the dynamic case, differentiation among private providers provides a fur-
ther social benefit, namely information about the true distribution of incorpo-
rating firms. Private providers, then, respond to the incentive to innovate and
improve their offerings to achieve a better fit with the diverse needs of the
market. The emulation that characterizes public provision, however, imposes
a further cost in dynamic environments, as it fails to generate socially useful
information about the actual distribution of incorporating firms. Even here, the
functional risk-aversion that emanates from reelection goals (or similar desid-
erata that diverge from profit maximization) gives public regulators less in-
centive than private providers to gamble in order to learn more about the
needs of the incorporating population. Thus, in instances where state corporate
regulatory practices appear to converge on a model archetype (e.g., Romano,
1985, at 233–42), our analysis suggests that such convergence need not nec-
essarily be the product of a healthy competitive practice, but instead may be
exactly the opposite—an artifact of excess emulation among states, whose
maximands need not coincide with those of profit-maximizing providers. In-
deed, if—as we maintain—firm characteristics are diversified in a way that
implies different optimal forms of regulation, a healthy form of competition
would likely induce divergence (rather than convergence) among states.14
Our model also provides some basis for another observation that is some-
times made about the nature of state competition over corporate law, namely
that states are motivated by their interest in not losing, as opposed to gaining,
corporate law business. Macey and Miller (1987) and Eisenberg (1983) sug-
gest that Delaware, for example, may be particularly motivated to adapt its
corporate law so as not to lose what has become a significant source of revenue
for the state treasury. Our model captures this in equilibrium reasoning: our
public providers pool on a single location, and do not risk differentiation
even in a dynamic setting, because they risk real losses if the state loses
14. For a similar argument, see Kahan and Kamar (2002), who note that many other forms of
regulatory behavior diffuse in a manner similar to that suggested by Romano, even though it is
unlikely that states compete in those regulatory arenas (such as abortion).
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‘‘customers’’ and do not perceive any real gain from trying to attract a larger
market share.
An important generalization of our model would treat the number of pro-
viders, public or private, as an endogenous feature of equilibrium. Our con-
jecture is that this generalization would magnify the differences between
public and private provision. Free entry will introduce, in the case of private
provision, the possibility of excessive differentiation as sometimes character-
izes models with spatial competition. Free entry (and exit) under public pro-
vision, however, may well reduce the number of public providers. Public
providers essentially divide up the possible revenues from servicing the needs
of incorporating firms in order to maximize the private benefits derived from
public revenues. As the number of public providers increases and hence the
market share of each provider decreases, the price that must be charged in
equilibrium increases: as we saw, equilibrium requires a price that nets the
revenues of p:
Perhaps more interesting, however, is the effect of introducing heterogene-
ity among legislators in terms of p; the equilibrium revenue target for max-
imizing private benefits. Legislators in states with smaller populations and
hence smaller state budgets overall may have lower p and may be able to ef-
fectively underprice competitor legislators from large states. Larger states
may also be ones in which the ‘‘productivity’’ of corporate law revenues from
the legislator’s reelection perspective (q#(p)) is low or negligible, due to the
low salience of this source of revenue; low salience may also make the cost
of transforming corporate law revenue increases into improved reelection
chances (r#(p)) high, implying that legislators in larger states will be relatively
uninterested in competing for corporate law revenues. Our conjecture is that
introducing heterogeneity (in concert with endogenous entry) is likely to lead
to the result that corporate law is provided only by states where p is relatively
low. Such a result would shed interesting light on the fact that, as we observe,
the provision of corporate law is not only in fact concentrated in a dominant
state, but the dominant state—Delaware—is also small.15
A more general model might also take into account the role of courts, in
addition to legislators, in developing corporate law. Courts learn from their
adjudications about the nature of the firms they regulate. There is a literature,
beginning with Posner (1973), devoted to assessing the claim that judge-made
law will evolve to efficiency. Several authors have demonstrated limitations to
the capacity of courts to develop efficient rules through adjudication. For ex-
ample, Hadfield (1992) has argued that learning through serial adjudication
may be hampered by selection bias on the learning path, and similarly Talley
(1999) has analyzed whether legal precedent has the makings of an infor-
mation cascade. Ostensibly, legislators face the capacity to overcome these
judicial constraints on learning: they can be proactive and not merely reactive
15. Our model would therefore provide a way of making concrete Eisenberg’s (1983) sugges-
tion that states that rely on corporate law revenues for a larger share of total revenues will be more
responsive to demand among incorporating firms.
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in collecting data. As our model has shown, however, they may not face the
incentive to take advantage of their superior capacity (relative to courts) to
learn.
An expanded model might also take more explicit account of the role of
interest groups—such as the legal profession—in generating incentives for
states to produce corporate law. Our model provides a partial analysis of
the role of interest groups: we can interpret the ‘‘public’’ profits generated from
corporate law to include the profits earned by lawyers in the state. (Macey and
Miller, 1987, discuss the role of the legal profession in the development of
Delaware corporate law.) From the legislator’s perspective, these profits
may also be transformed into a private benefit at some cost, and we would
expect again that in equilibrium, legislators may have exhausted the cost-
effective use of this source of revenues to improve reelection chances. Our
model is not, however, a complete model of the role of lawyers as an interest
group, both because it does not take into account how lawyers price their ser-
vices, and because it does not consider the possibility that lobbying efforts by
the corporate bar may be directed specifically to the enactment of particular
corporate law provisions. In our model, campaign contributions from interest
groups are implicitly assumed to arise simply from the generation of wealth for
the group, not from the enactment of specific legislative proposals. Our model
does provide a framework for analyzing these more particularized interest
group effects, notably because we show that almost any location can be an
equilibrium under public provision. This would allow interest group prefer-
ences over specific locations (such as corporate law that encourages higher
litigation rates, benefiting the legal profession, as Macey and Miller, 1987,
suggest) to be incorporated.
Models with more complex descriptions of public incentives to create law
will not, however, displace our fundamental point that public providers do not
face profit-maximization incentives, and hence that public ‘‘competition’’ over
the provision of law will not, in general, mimic market provision. Public pro-
viders face a cost in transforming public revenues into private benefits. This is
an insight that applies not only to state competition over corporate law but,
indeed, to the wide range of settings in which the economic theory of regu-
latory competition (Stigler, 1971; Peltzman, 1976) is applied.
In fact, we ultimately seek to shift the debate about regulatory competition
onto different terrain than the traditional literature. That literature focuses only
on competition between public entities, looking for ways in which that com-
petition might mimic competition between profit-maximizing firms. But when
law is addressed to its economic function—when ‘‘good’’ law is defined in
terms of its capacity to structure efficient market relationships, such as those
between shareholders and managers in the corporation—there is no obvious
reason why this law should be provided by the state. Indeed, the basic premise
of market democracies is that the market will, in general, do a better job than
the state in achieving efficiency goals in the design and provision of services,
in producing what Romano (1985) calls ‘‘law as product.’’ Law in its economic
function, we claim, is an economic input. Showing that private provision will
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outperform public provision of this input is not that different from showing that
private provision of any good or service will generally outperform public pro-
vision because of the benefits of profit-maximization incentives.
We do not, however, want to give short shrift to some important limitations
on this point. First, as we recognize throughout modern market democracies,
real-life competitive markets often depart from the ideal and often will require
public regulation and intervention to overcome market failures. If market fail-
ures are sufficiently severe, it may be that public provision is preferable: in this
setting, the choice is a matter of comparative institutional competence and
performance. We would expect that a more complete inquiry into the private
provision of corporate law would have to examine the potential for market
failures and hence the need for regulation aimed at structuring efficient mar-
kets for private law provision. Additionally, our model does not consider the
long-run incentives or capacity of public or private providers to commit to
a particular regime; we have implicitly assumed that incorporating firms
see no risk that a corporate law regime will fail or change at some point after
they have (possibly) sunk costs in that regime. The durability of public pro-
vision may be an advantage of state corporate law over private corporate law:
unlike private firms, states (at least in stable democracies such as the United
States) are not at risk of disappearing. On the other hand, private providers with
immortal commercial identities may have greater capacity to commit to du-
rable rules and enforcement practices by relying on reputational capital than do
individual legislators, who face eventual replacement and who capture no
gains from the reputation of the legislative body as a whole. A fuller model
would take these considerations into account.
Second, although we have emphasized the differences between public and
private provision in terms of the response of the provider to information
learned about the distribution of incorporating firms, we have not modeled
the legal innovation process itself. Indeed, we have implicitly assumed that
the alternative governance regimes (locations in our model) are obvious.
To the extent that the development of optimal regimes tailored to the needs
of heterogeneous firms requires investment in resources and publication of the
regime attributes in order to attract ‘‘customers’’, there may be free-riding
problems and hence underinvestment in regime innovation in the absence
of intellectual property protection. This is a problem in many areas of legal
innovation: the design of contracts to govern both complex and standardized
transactions, for example. No doubt perfect protection for investments in legal
products is not available. Note, however, that our model does not rest on a per-
fectly competitive private market; the locational model we employ assumes
imperfect competition. Moreover, our model predicts that private firms will
not seek to mimic each other’s regimes. This may be an advantage of the pri-
vate regime; in addition, private providers may have greater access to intel-
lectual property protection, given that public works may not be copyrighted.
A complete account of the impact of the public good attributes of regime in-
novation on the relative efficiency of public versus private provision of cor-
porate law, nonetheless, remains for further work.
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Finally, we recognize that not all features of ‘‘corporate law’’ are concerned
exclusively with efficiency. Modern market democracies seek to achieve mul-
tiple goals, only one of which is efficient production of goods and services. Our
model measures the social benefits of corporate law in efficiency terms only.
We do not by this intend to claim that nonefficiency goals have no place in
corporate law. Indeed, our model assumes away another potential ‘‘distortion’’
in the public provision of corporate law, namely the incentives of legislators to
pursue nonefficiency goals in designing a corporate law regime. The achieve-
ment of nonefficiency goals, however, is not displaced by private provision of
those features of corporate law that are efficiency based. The world of private
corporate law regimes is still a world subject to public regulation. Even if the
rules governing judicial scrutiny of managerial discretion or the use of take-
over defenses are set by a private corporate law regime with efficiency goals in
mind, that does not preclude public regulation if and when nonefficiency val-
ues are at stake, such as politically determined limitations on firm size or labor
force and community disruption from takeovers.
Our basic claim, however, is that we would do well to recognize that law
simultaneously serves both narrow economic/efficiency functions and broader
democratic functions. To the extent that the former matters (even if only as
a factor of the larger analysis), there is good reason to explore the potential
for private provision of law.
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